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What Kierkegaard Meant by Despair | The Sickness Unto Death
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What Kierkegaard Meant by Despair | The Sickness Unto Death

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This longform essay reads the book of eighteen forty-nine closely and in its own order, beginning with its famous opening definition, the self as a relation that relates itself to itself. It follows the diagnosis that Kierkegaard published under the invented name Anti-Climacus (Sygdommen til Doden in Danish), the synthesis of the infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity, and the sickness that cannot kill. It meets the girl who loses her lover, the man who wants to be Caesar or nothing, the house whose owner lives in the cellar and the king without a country. It sets out the despair of weakness, the despair of defiance, despair as sin before God, offense and the despair of forgiveness, and the sentence in which the book states its cure. A shorter chapter tells the life, from his engagement to Regine Olsen to his late attack on the church.

Which is harder to see in oneself, a despair that hides or a despair that wears the look of strength?

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Full transcript

For the record

Chapter 1: Man Is Spirit: The Opening Lines

Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself, or it is that in the relation by which the relation relates itself to itself. The self is not the relation but the relation's relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. In short, a synthesis.

Those are the lines with which the argument of The Sickness unto Death begins, a book by the Danish writer Soren Kierkegaard. Anyone who meets them cold, in a bookshop or on a screen, could be forgiven for shutting the book and never opening it again. Many readers have done exactly that.

It would be a loss. The lines sound like a lock, but they work as a key, and what they open is nothing exotic. It is the ordinary business of living with oneself.

Everyone has met someone who cannot settle into their own life, or has been that someone. They want a different job, a different body, a different past. Why is it so hard to simply be the person you are? On the face of it nothing could be easier, since you are already that person and have been all along. No effort is needed to be oneself. Yet people strain at it for a lifetime, and some of the strain looks like ambition, some like modesty, and some like a cheerful refusal to think about it at all.

The lines themselves are hard, and translators have felt it. Some English editions put extra words in square brackets inside the sentence, simply to make the grammar easier to follow, and the brackets have been argued over almost as much as the lines. The version spoken here is a faithful rendering in the plainest terms the sentences allow. Published translations differ from it in small ways, and none of them is easy.

Start with the word spirit, which is easy to mishear. Spirit here has nothing to do with ghosts or churches. It names whatever makes a human being more than a body that gets hungry and a brain that solves problems. Both of those are things that happen to a person. Spirit is what stands back from the whole arrangement, says this is me, and then has to decide what to do about that.

A relation is what holds between two things. The distance between two towns belongs to neither town. A marriage is a relation between two people, and it is not either of them. Imagine a relation that turns back on the one who is inside it. A person has an attitude toward their own life, and the attitude is part of the life.

Kierkegaard calls that standing back the self. He says that the self is a relation that relates itself to itself, and the odd grammar is the point. It means that a self is not a thing, like a stone or an organ. It is a stance, the way a person stands toward their own life. Think how many stances there are. A person can be proud of themselves or ashamed of themselves. They can forgive themselves, surprise themselves, talk themselves into a plan and out of it again. They can catch sight of themselves in a shop window and dislike what they see. They can decide to start over, or decide that they are too old to start anything. People say that they are just being themselves, as if that were the simplest thing, and they say that they no longer know who they are, as if a self could be mislaid like a set of keys. Both sayings make sense only for a being that has a relation to itself. A stone does none of this. A dog may be afraid or hungry, yet it does not wonder what sort of dog it is.

The stance is the self, and it is never fixed. Two people can have the same face, the same history and the same list of faults, and one of them lives at ease with all of it while the other spends years in flight from it. The facts are identical. The difference lies in how each one stands toward the facts. That difference, and not the facts themselves, is what those lines call the self. Most definitions of the self name a substance, a soul, a bundle of memories, a brain. This one names an activity, something a person keeps doing, well or badly, for as long as they live.

It is worth saying what sort of writer stands behind them. Kierkegaard lived in Copenhagen in the first half of the nineteenth century, and he thought that the great philosophical systems of his day explained everything in the world except the person reading them. He wanted a book about that person, meaning the one who has to get up in the morning and be somebody. The lines that open this argument are his attempt to say, in the most exact terms he could find, what such a person is.

Kierkegaard's word for the condition in which the stance goes wrong is despair. He does not mean sadness. A person can be in despair in his sense while laughing at a party, while admired at work, while told by everyone that they are lucky. A person can even lose themselves quietly, in the author's phrase, so that nobody notices, the person included. What the word names is a fault in the stance, not the weather of a mood.

The sentences themselves are built to match the fault. Try a small experiment. Notice that you are listening. Then notice that you noticed it. Then notice whoever was doing the noticing, and ask whether that one is the same as the first listener. Each step is a self looking at itself, and each can be followed by another, without end. That doubling is not a trick of language. It is what a being is like that has a stance toward itself, and Kierkegaard wrote the definition as a sentence that loops, so that hearing it feels a little like doing what it describes. The dizziness a listener may feel is not a failure of understanding. It is a first, faint sample of the subject.

The book came out in eighteen forty-nine, when its author was thirty-six. It is not long. It is, in places, startlingly concrete, and its reputation for difficulty comes almost entirely from the page where the argument starts. Those lines sound like a wall. They are closer to a mirror, held up by someone who is watching to see whether the person in front of it will look or turn away.

Chapter 2: This Sickness Is Not Unto Death

The pages that come before those famous lines are the ones most readers skip, and they set the whole tone of the book. They begin with a title page that is stranger than it looks.

The book is called The Sickness unto Death. Its subtitle calls it a Christian psychological exposition for upbuilding and awakening. The name of its author is not Kierkegaard. The title page gives the name Anti-Climacus, an invented writer, and lists Kierkegaard only as the editor.

The subtitle is worth taking apart, because each word makes a promise. Christian says that the frame is in plain view. Psychological says that the subject is the inner life, the moods and habits and evasions of one person alone with themselves. Exposition says that the book will set things out patiently and in order, not argue with an opponent. And the last phrase names two jobs at once. Upbuilding is meant for the reader who is ready to be strengthened. The older word edification means the same thing, and both come from the picture of building a house inside a person. Awakening is meant for the reader who would rather not be.

Beneath the title stands a single sentence from the Gospel of John. It is spoken by Jesus about a friend who is ill, a man named Lazarus. Messengers tell Jesus that Lazarus is sick, and he answers that this sickness is not unto death. The old word unto means toward, so the sentence says that the illness will not end in death. Jesus then stays where he is for two more days. By the time he reaches the village, Lazarus has been in his tomb for four days, and the mourners have already gathered. Jesus weeps. Then he goes to the tomb and calls his friend out alive.

The sentence looks like a mistake, since the sickness did end in a grave. The author takes the apparent mistake as his starting point. In the introduction he explains that, seen in a Christian light, death is not the end of anything. It is something that life passes through, and Lazarus was only passing through it. If even death does not have the last word, then no illness of the body, however fatal, deserves the name of a sickness unto death in the full sense. The bodily illnesses are all, in the end, curable, whether by a doctor or by the thing that raised Lazarus.

The book was written for readers who already thought of themselves as Christians, and that is part of what the word awakening means. Its first audience was a country in which nearly everyone was baptized, and the author feared that for many of them the name had come to stand in place of the thing.

In the author's eyes, Christianity is a medicine, and a medicine is worth nothing to a person who does not know they are ill. That explains why the book begins with a diagnosis and not with comfort.

And yet the book carries that very phrase as its title. The phrase must therefore point to something else, a sickness that no doctor treats and that the rising of the dead does not cure. The author has a name for it, and the name is despair.

The introduction adds a twist about fear. Ordinary people fear illness and poverty. They fear disgrace and the loss of those they love, and above all they fear death. A person who has been taught to think as a Christian, the author says, has learned to fear in a different way. Such a person has been shown something worse than all of those, and the old fears shrink beside it. Picture someone facing a grim diagnosis. They are afraid of pain, of weakness, of leaving their family behind. The author's claim is that there is a further fear under those, the fear of not being, in the end, oneself.

He gives the rare courage that meets this fear a name. It is the courage to venture to be oneself, this particular person and no other, alone before God. The phrase arrives early and is easy to overlook, yet it stands as a description of the book's real subject. Everything that follows, every kind of despair the author lists, can be seen as a way of not having that courage.

A listener who does not share the faith may feel a door closing here. It helps to notice how the book is arranged. The Christian frame is declared at the start, openly, in the epigraph and the introduction. After that, most of the book is taken up with descriptions of inner states, and those descriptions are given in ordinary terms that can be checked against experience. A reader does not have to believe anything to ask whether they fit. The faith returns in force only in the later pages. Until then the book can be used as a map of how people go wrong with themselves, and each reader can judge whether the map matches the country.

The preface explains the book's odd manner, which mixes severity with something near tenderness. The author admits that many readers will find the form strange. It may seem too strict to be uplifting, he says, and too uplifting to count as scholarship. He answers with a picture. A Christian book, he says, should speak the way a physician speaks at the sickbed. Even if only other doctors can follow the technical terms, the speaker must never forget that the room holds a sick person.

The book is divided into two parts. The first describes despair as a sickness of the self and sorts its many forms. The second asks what the same condition looks like when it is seen before God, where it takes the name of sin. The two halves are meant to be taken as one argument, the second lighting up what the first had described in the dark.

A physician works in a fixed order. First the disease is named and described, then its kinds are told apart, then its cause is traced, and only at the end does the cure come into view. The book follows that order. It describes the sickness and sorts its forms, then it asks where the sickness comes from, and it leaves the cure mostly for the last pages.

That picture governs the whole work. The book is not a lecture about despair delivered by someone safe at a distance. Its long lists of distinctions, and there are many, are meant as a doctor's distinctions, made in order to find a sickness in the particular person who is reading. The coldness of the prose and its warmth come from the same source. Before the author defines anything, he reminds the reader that someone is ill.

Chapter 3: The Self as a Relation and a Synthesis

The second half of the famous passage names three pairs of opposites. They look like a list of abstractions, but each one stands for something a person meets on an ordinary weekday.

Take someone deciding whether to leave their home town. The finite side of the decision is everything that makes them this particular person. They have this body and this age. They have a certain bank balance, parents who are getting old and a job that pays the rent. None of that can be wished away. The infinite side is the power to picture things otherwise. The same person can imagine living in a dozen cities, in a dozen trades, as a dozen different people, and the imagination has no natural edge. It can run ahead of the facts as far as it likes. A person is the place where the two meet, a creature with a fixed address and a mind that does not stay at home.

The second pair is the temporal and the eternal. The temporal side is easy to feel. A person lives in time, one minute after another, and time takes things from them. They age, they forget, they run out of years. The eternal side is harder to name, but most people have touched it. It is whatever in a person refuses to be only a passing moment. It shows in a promise that is meant to hold for forty years. It shows in the sense that some things are simply true whether or not anyone is looking. It shows in the feeling that a life has a shape and a meaning as a whole, and is not just a string of Tuesdays. A person stands in time and keeps reaching past it.

The third pair is freedom and necessity. Necessity is what is given. No one chose their parents or their first language. No one chose their temperament or the century they were born in, and no one can undo the mistakes they made at twenty. Freedom is the power to do something with what is given, to choose a direction, to keep a vow or break it. Again a person lives at the point where the two cross. They are not free in a void, and they are not merely a product of their causes.

The word the author uses for this is synthesis, and he means it differently from the philosopher whom everyone in his day was reading. For Hegel, a synthesis was a higher unity in which opposites are resolved, something a thinker could see from above and explain. For Kierkegaard, a person is a synthesis that is never resolved from above. It has to be held, one day at a time, from inside. A synthesis in his sense is not a blend, like coffee and milk, where the opposites disappear into one brown liquid. It is closer to a balance, like a tightrope walker holding two opposite pulls in a tension that has to be kept up. Both ends remain opposed. A person is not half infinite and half finite. A person is wholly both, and the task of living is to hold the two together.

The author adds a small, strange detail about how the relation between two things works. The relation between two things, he says, is a third thing. It is a dead one, a mere fact of their being side by side. Think of two neighbors who live next door to each other. Their neighborhood is a relation between them, and it does nothing. A body and a mind sit together in the same way in an animal, each affecting the other and neither watching the arrangement. The author calls such a third thing negative. A living third, which he calls positive, appears only when the relation starts to relate itself to itself.

Here the passage takes a turn that catches many readers. A synthesis, it says, is only a relation between two things, and a human being considered only in that way is not yet a self. Consider what that means. Two poles with a tension between them describe an animal well enough. An animal has a body and something like a mind, and the two pull on each other and in some way cooperate. It is a living relation, and nothing more. The animal does not stand back from its own tension and take a view of it.

The author calls the missing ingredient spirit. A human being, he says, is a synthesis of soul and body that is held up by spirit. Spirit is a third element, and it is of a different kind from the first two. It is the power of the relation to turn round and relate to itself. That is why the passage moves from the pairs to the self in one breath. The pairs are the raw material, and spirit is what takes them up.

An example helps. Imagine someone pulled in two directions by their parents' expectations and their own hopes. If they merely feel the pull, they are a relation between two tugs and are dragged back and forth like a rope. If they look at the tug of war, name it, decide how much weight to give each side and what sort of life to make out of the tension, then they have become a self. The tension is the same in both cases. What has changed is that the relation has begun to relate itself to itself.

One consequence is that a self is never finished. A stone is what it is. A person has to keep taking up their own situation, with a new day's body and a new day's memories, and the taking up is never complete. Later in the book the author speaks of the self as something that has to become itself, which he treats as a task and not as a possession. To be a person at all is to be in the middle of a job.

The logic of the passage also sets up the structure of everything that follows. If being a self means holding two opposite pulls in balance, then each pair can be lost in exactly two ways. A person can lean too far toward one pole, or too far toward the other. Someone can live wholly in the infinite, all imagination and no address. Someone else can live wholly in the finite, all address and no imagination. The same holds for freedom and necessity, and for the temporal and the eternal. A large part of the book is a survey of the ways a person can lose the balance. Its sickness, despair, is one of these leanings, settled in and left uncorrected.

That is the reason the sickness can grow so quietly. A person does not need a disaster to lose the balance. Leaning a little, for years, will do it.

Chapter 4: Despair as a Misrelation of the Self

Nobody applied to exist. That simple fact carries the next step of the author's argument, and everything after it depends on the step.

A self, he says, must have come about in one of two ways. Either it set itself up, or it was set up by something else. Test that against a life. You did not choose this body or this temperament, or the century you were born in, and you did not choose the language in which you first learned to think about yourself. You can work on the stance you take toward all of that, and the working is the self at its most active. But every scrap of the material was supplied before you began. A person is handed a situation and asked to take it up.

The author draws the conclusion without hesitation. The human self, he says, is a derived relation. It is a relation that turns back on itself and, in doing so, relates itself to another, the power that established it. In the book that power is God, and the author never pretends otherwise. A listener can still pause on the structure before the name. A being that did not make itself stands in a debt it never contracted. Whatever it does with itself, it does in relation to whatever brought it into being.

People take up that fact in very different ways. Some meet the fact of having been given a life with something like thanks. Some meet it with resentment, as if the terms had been unfair and nobody had asked their consent. Some never meet it at all and go through their days as if their existence were a matter of course. Each of these is a stance toward the source, even when the person would never use the word, and the author's claim is that the stance toward the source and the stance toward oneself cannot be separated.

The author's argument cuts against the most admired picture of a person in his own age and ours, the self-made individual. A self-made person is supposed to be the author of their own character, owing nothing to anyone and answerable to nobody. The argument says that this picture describes an impossible thing. A person can shape what they were given, and can shape it with great skill, but the shaping always starts from a given, and a self that insists it has no source has only hidden the source from view.

Two kinds of despair follow from this, and the argument for them is unexpected. Suppose, the author says, that a human self had set itself up. Then only one kind of despair would be possible, the kind in which a person wants to get rid of themselves. But there is a second kind, in which a person desperately wants to be themselves, on their own terms, answerable to nobody. The existence of that second kind, he argues, shows that the self cannot stand on its own. A self that really could rest on itself would have no need to insist that it does. The insistence is the symptom. It is a sign that the self cannot find its balance alone and is straining to hide the fact.

From here the author gives his definition of despair, and it is worth hearing slowly. Despair is a misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that relates itself to itself and has been established by another. Take the clauses apart. The synthesis is the pairing of opposites. The relating of it to itself is spirit. The phrase established by another says that the whole thing has a source. And a misrelation in such a structure is not a private accident. It reflects itself, in the author's words, infinitely in the relation to the power that established it. When a person's stance toward themselves goes wrong, the wrongness does not stay inside them. It is also a wrong stance toward whatever set them up. The two kinds of despair then look like mirror images. One person wants to be rid of the self they were given. The other wants to be only the self they choose for themselves. Both are refusing the same thing, which is to be, simply and without condition, what they are.

A concrete case makes this less abstract. Someone who despises themselves is at war with the life they were given. They refuse the body, the history or the character that came with them. The author would say that this refusal is not only a quarrel with oneself. It is a quarrel with the giver. That is why he treats despair as a matter of the whole person's standing, and not as a mood that happens to occupy the mind.

Having defined the sickness, the author asks a question about it. Is despair an advantage or a defect? His answer is that it is both. The capacity for despair, he says, is a human being's advantage over the animal. It marks a person out more deeply than walking upright does, since it is a sign of height of another kind, the height of being spirit. A creature that can despair is a creature that has a relation to itself, and only such a creature can get that relation wrong.

He then gives three steps in a row, each of which raises the stakes. The possibility of the sickness is the advantage a human being has over an animal. Being sharply aware of the sickness is the advantage a Christian has over the natural person. And being healed of the sickness is the Christian's blessedness. To be able to be sick is a sign of a high nature, to know one is sick is a sign of awakening, and to be cured is the goal.

The pattern is familiar from everyday life. Only a being who can be proud can be ashamed. Only a being who can love can grieve. The capacity for the sickness is the shadow of a capacity for health, and a stone or a cat has neither. But the author does not let the advantage soften the picture. To be able to despair is an advantage, he says, and to be in despair is ruin.

One more point about its nature belongs here, and it is easy to miss. Despair, for the author, is not an injury from the past. A fever can be caught once, run its course, and be over. Despair is not like that. It is a condition that has to be kept up, and the person in it is, in a sense, producing it at every moment. Someone who says that they have been like this since the accident is describing the despair in the past tense. The author would say that if they are still in it, they are doing it again at this moment, the way a person who keeps a fist clenched is clenching it again with each minute.

He does not mean this as an accusation. The point is structural. Since despair is a misrelation in the act of relating, it can only exist while the relating goes on, and it can only end when the relating changes. No change of circumstances alone can end it, since the circumstances are only the material. That is the reason the cure, when the book reaches it, has to be described as a change in how a person stands, and not as the arrival of good luck.

Chapter 5: The Sickness Unto Death Explained

In everyday English, a sickness unto death is a fatal illness. A doctor who used the phrase would mean an illness that ends in a grave. The author of the book takes that meaning and turns it over in two stages.

The first turn was made in the introduction, where bodily illness was removed from the category. For a Christian, death is a passage, and so no illness of the body counts as the real sickness unto death. The second turn is stranger. Despair, the author says, is the sickness unto death in a sense that has nothing to do with the grave. Its torment is that it cannot end in death at all.

He compares the condition to that of a person who lies dying and struggles with death and cannot die. Most people have heard of a long, hard dying of that kind, where the body holds on past all hope and the end will not come. The author says that despair is like that, but in the self. Its whole horror is that the release is refused.

An old Greek story gives the same fear a face. A goddess fell in love with a mortal man and asked the gods to make him immortal, and they granted her wish. She had forgotten to ask for youth as well. The man went on living and went on aging, smaller and weaker with every century, until he was nothing but a voice that would not stop. The author does not tell that story, but it shows why the thought of a death that never comes is worse than the thought of death.

Then he describes a ladder of hope, and each rung is a rung down. When the danger is greatest, he says, a person hopes for life. When a worse danger shows itself, a person hopes for death. And when the danger is so great that death itself has become the hope, despair is the hopelessness of not even being able to die.

A small example shows what he is pointing at. Someone has done something they are deeply ashamed of, and the shame is complete. They wish the floor would open. They do not necessarily want to die. They want to stop being the person who did the thing, to step out of their own skin and leave it on the carpet. And that is the one exit that does not exist. They can leave the room, the town and the job. They can change their name. They cannot leave the one who did it. The self is what goes along wherever a person goes.

The author puts the same point in a phrase that sounds like a riddle. To be sick unto death, he says, is to die death. To die, in the ordinary sense, means that it is all over. To die death would mean living to experience one's own death, going through it as one goes through an afternoon. And an experience of that kind, if it lasted even a moment, would in effect last forever, since there would be no afterward in which to recover from it.

Why can the death not take place? The answer he gives is that there is something in a person that cannot be destroyed. It is the eternal in them, which is what he means by the self. A fever can burn out the body, but it cannot burn out the thing that is doing the suffering. Despair is an attempt to consume oneself, and the attempt keeps failing, since what it tries to consume is the one thing that is not perishable.

A listener who does not share his faith can still follow the structure. The self, on this account, is whatever remains when everything else has been taken away, and it is the only item in a life that cannot be left behind. A person can give up a place, a marriage, a career or a reputation. They can even, in a sense, give up a belief about who they are. They cannot give up the fact that somebody has to go on being them. The author's language about the eternal is the religious name for that stubborn remainder.

The same remainder has a second face. The thing that makes despair endless is also the thing that makes a cure possible. A self that could be consumed would be beyond help, since there would be nothing left to heal. The author will not treat the impossibility of dying as only a curse. It is the sign that a person is made of something lasting, and what lasts can be set right.

The next thing he says is the most harrowing passage in the book. Despair, he says, is self-consumption, a wish to use oneself up. But it is an impotent self-consumption, unable to do what it wants. And this impotence is itself a new form of self-consumption, because the failure to consume oneself adds to the torment, which adds to the wish to be rid of oneself, which fails again. The despair is raised, in his words, to a higher power. Each round is worse than the last, like a spiral that tightens as it turns.

He gives the spiral two images. One is cold fire, a burning that warms nothing. The other is a gnawing canker, a sore that moves constantly inward, deeper and deeper. And he adds a detail that runs against the ordinary notion of comfort. That the despair does not destroy the person, he says, is no relief to them. It is exactly the torment. It keeps the pain alive, and it keeps life in the pain.

Think of how an old humiliation behaves in the mind. A person replays the moment, winces, tries to stop thinking about it, and the trying only brings it back with more heat. The mind wants to consume the memory and cannot, and the failure itself becomes a new humiliation, the humiliation of being unable to stop. The author's claim is that the same pattern runs through the whole self, at a much deeper level than any one memory.

The vocabulary of the whole book is medical, and the passage shows why. The author speaks of a patient and of symptoms, of crises and relapses, of a disease that the sufferer may not know he has. A physician would recognize the method. Start with the most obvious signs, then trace them to their cause, and never assume that the patient's own account of his health is reliable.

It is important to see what this is and is not. The author is not describing clinical depression, which has causes and treatments that a doctor understands. He is describing a condition of the self that can exist under a cheerful surface, and that may or may not come with any feeling of sadness at all. The comparison with dying is a way of showing how deep the trouble goes, and not a recommendation of any kind.

For the image of it, he reaches back to something older than himself. The passage ends by borrowing a picture from the Gospels, of a fire that is not quenched and a worm that does not die.

Chapter 6: Despair Over Oneself: Girl and Caesar

The book gives an example of a young woman who has lost the man she loved. He has died, or he has been unfaithful, and the author leaves it open which. Either way, she is in despair, and she would tell you that she is in despair over him.

The author says that she is wrong, and he says it without any coldness. She is not in despair over the man, he says, or not in the end. She is in despair over herself. Consider what she had gained in loving him. In being his beloved she had a self she was glad to have, a self that was full, because it was defined by him. She would have been happy to lose herself in that. The man is gone, and the self that was defined by him remains. It has to go on, and it has nothing in it. It has become a loathsome void, or, if he was unfaithful, a reminder of the betrayal.

He adds a small scene. Try saying to such a girl, he writes, that she is consuming herself. The reply he imagines is that she wishes she could, that the torment is precisely that she cannot. That answer is the center of the example. Notice how much she has seen. She has already understood that the trouble is not out in the world, where she could repair it, but in the self, which she cannot leave. That is a step toward self-knowledge, even if it is a painful one. She does not want to survive as herself. She wants to escape the self that is left, and there is no way to do it.

The second example is of a different kind of person, an ambitious man. His motto is that he will be Caesar or nothing. Then he does not become Caesar, and he falls into despair. Anyone would say that he is despairing over his failure to win supreme power. The motto matters. A person who says Caesar or nothing has made his whole worth depend on one outcome, and has told the world that any other result is a kind of death. He has given the world the power to decide whether he is anybody.

The author says the same thing about him as about the girl, and he spells it out with care. The man, he says, is not truly despairing over the fact that he did not become Caesar. He is despairing over himself for not having become Caesar. The self that failed to become Caesar is intolerable to him. More exactly, what is intolerable to him is that he cannot get rid of it.

Then the author adds a turn that most readers do not expect. If the man had become Caesar, he says, he would have been in despair as well, though in a different form. He would have been in a delight that is itself a kind of flight, since he would have got rid of himself by turning into Caesar. A person who becomes entirely their role has not become themselves. They have disappeared into something else. The ambitious man is in despair either way, says the author, for he does not possess a self. He would either have lost it in a triumph or been stuck with it in a failure.

Step back from the two examples and notice what they share. In each case the person believes that the trouble is located in a thing outside. The girl thinks it is in the lost man, and the ambitious man thinks it is in the lost throne. The author's diagnosis is that the thing outside is only the occasion, and the real object of the despair is the self. The loss exposes a fact that was true before it happened, which is that the self had been resting on something that could be taken away. The author watches the moment when this becomes visible. In one breath the person says that they despair over this or that, and in the next breath the thing drops out of the sentence, and the despair has no object but the one who is despairing. It is as if a sentence that began with a borrowed noun had to be finished with a pronoun.

That gives the book a first reply to a question about why being oneself can be so hard. The self in these examples was never simply itself. It was borrowed from a lover, or from an ambition, or from a place in the world, and a borrowed self has to be returned when the lender calls it in. What is left is a person who has never had to stand on their own footing, and who finds that there is no footing there.

A self can be built from the outside in. Some people take their sense of who they are from a marriage, some from a career, some from a cause or a city or a family name. None of these is shameful, and most of them are good things. The trouble lies in the way they are held. If a person is propped up by them as a building is propped up by scaffolding, then taking away the scaffolding brings the building down.

What makes being oneself so hard to begin? The book's first reply is that many people have never tried, and that they find out only when the scaffolding goes.

The same pattern can be seen in smaller cases, which the author does not mention but which fit his rule. A person loses the job that has been their whole identity and says that they are nothing without it. A person is passed over for an honor and finds that they cannot bear their own company. A person's children leave home and the house seems to have lost its owner. In each case the reported cause is the loss. The author's suggestion would be to look at who it is that cannot bear the loss, and to ask why that person has no other place to stand.

He compresses the whole discovery into a formula, and the formula is one of the few sentences in the book that can be said in a breath. To despair over oneself, in despair to will to be rid of oneself, is the formula for all despair. Every other form in the book, he says, can be traced back to this one. What looks like despair over a thing is despair over the self, and what looks like a desire for something else is a desire to escape.

Two cautions keep the formula from becoming cruel. First, the author does not say that the loss is small. The girl's grief is real and the man's failure is real, and nothing in the book asks them to pretend otherwise. Grief, as such, is not despair. A person can mourn deeply and still stand where they stood.

Second, the author does not say that the girl is to blame. He describes her as a person in a sickness, and the tone is a doctor's at the bedside. What he says is only that her loss is not the whole of what is wrong. The part of it that is not the loss is the part that remains after the loss has been mourned.

Chapter 7: Why Everyone Is in Despair

Many people think of despair as a rare visitor. It calls on the very unlucky, the very sensitive and the very gloomy, and it passes the rest of humanity by. The author says that this belief is the most comfortable mistake in the world, and he spends a short section taking it apart.

The everyday notion of despair is simple. A person despairs when they say so. They have lost hope, they announce it, and the word fits. The author's first step is to deny that the word can be settled by the patient's own report. Think of a man who limps and does not know it, or who has lost hearing in one ear so gradually that he thinks everyone has started to mumble. The condition is real, and the person is the last to notice. The author's suspicion is that despair is the most common condition of that kind.

His claim is blunt. Despair is universal, he says, or nearly so, and the person who is entirely free of it is far rarer than anyone supposes. The claim is meant in earnest, and it is meant about the cheerful, the successful and the busy as much as about the sad. That is what makes it hard to hear.

He argues for it by way of an analogy from medicine. Ask a good physician about the health of a whole town, he says, and the physician will not report a happy picture. Most of the people who think of themselves as well are walking about with some weakness or some undetected disorder. The physician knows how seldom anyone is perfectly healthy, and knows too that the people themselves are often the last to hear about it. The author proposes that an observer who really knew human beings would say the same of the spirit. Hardly anyone is entirely sound, and the people who believe they are have simply not been examined. A town doctor sees how nearly everyone has something. There is a bad back, a bad habit, a cough that is put down to the weather. The ailments are so ordinary that nobody thinks of them as illness at all.

He also describes what the physician of the spirit would notice, and the description is one of the best things in the book. Nearly everyone, he says, carries somewhere inside them an unrest. There is a discord and a disharmony that never quite resolves. There is an anxiety about something unknown, or about something the person does not dare to try to know. There is an anxiety about some possibility in life, or about themselves. The person goes about with it, he says, as someone goes about with an illness in the body. At times it flashes out in a fear that has no reason the person could name, and then it is covered over again.

Some of the ways that covering works are familiar from any life. A person cannot bear a quiet afternoon with nothing planned, and fills every gap with an errand, a screen or a conversation. A person works very late and says that they love being busy. A person feels an odd flicker of dread when the last visitor leaves and the house goes still, and puts it down to tiredness or the weather. A person who sits alone for ten minutes with no task finds the ten minutes uncomfortable, and cannot say why. None of these habits proves despair in the author's sense. He would say only that they fit the picture of a person who has some reason to keep moving.

The second half of his point is the reversal, and it is the part that most readers resist. The person who says that they have never known despair may be the very person who has never looked. It is not the gloomy poet who is surest to be sick. It may be the contented man who has found a way never to ask what his contentment rests on. The author thinks that no one can be believed on this subject by reporting how they feel. A sick person may feel perfectly well. A well person may feel perfectly awful, and still be in better order than the first.

An obvious objection rises here. A claim that treats every denial as further proof looks like a trap, since no one could ever disprove it. The author's reply, in effect, is that the standard is not a feeling. It is a fact about a relation, which is whether a person's stance toward themselves, and toward whatever set them up, is sound all the way through. That is a very demanding standard, and few could say truthfully that they meet it. A person might reasonably say that it cannot be settled from outside, and the author would agree. He would add that it can be asked from inside, honestly and slowly, and that many people have never asked it.

Why should health be so rare? The answer follows from the structure of the self already described. A person is a synthesis that has to be held and kept in tune with its source. Keeping that up is an achievement, and the default is drift. A little leaning, left uncorrected, is enough. A sudden misfortune can even be the moment the symptom first shows. The glimpses of anxiety come at odd times anyway, and a loss, a failure or a bereavement can make them too strong to cover over. The misfortune does not create the illness. It removes the anesthetic. The author's claim is therefore not that human beings are especially wicked or weak. It is that the task of being a self is harder than any ordinary skill, and that many people have not been shown it is a task.

There is an argument from numbers that the author considers and refuses. If nearly everyone is in despair, someone might say, then despair is simply normal, and calling it a sickness is pointless. He replies that a condition does not stop being an illness because it is common. A town can be full of people with the same undiagnosed complaint, and the fact that all the neighbors share it does not make it healthy. It only makes it harder to see.

The universality, in the end, changes the character of the book. If it were a rare disease, the book would be an account of a few unfortunate people. Since it is nearly everyone's disease, the book is about the reader, whoever the reader is. The author does not offer this as an accusation. The physician, after all, does not stand apart from the town. The diagnosis is meant to be heard the way a patient hears a doctor who has just put a finger on the sore place, with pain and some relief, since what has been named can at least be looked at.

Chapter 8: Losing Oneself: Infinitude and Finitude

A ship needs both sail and ballast. With too much sail and too little ballast it is blown over by the first strong wind, and with too much ballast and too little sail it sits in the harbor and rots. The first pair in the synthesis works in the same way. A person is made of the infinite and the finite, and the self can go wrong by losing either one. The author gives each way its own name, and the two are opposites that feel, from inside, like opposite virtues.

The first he calls infinitude's despair, which is the despair of lacking finitude. Its mark is that a person is carried so far out into the infinite that they are carried away from themselves. The author's word for it is fantastic, and he means nothing magical by the word. A fantastic self is one that has become so airy that it no longer touches the ground it stands on.

He gives three examples, one for each of the powers of the mind. The first is feeling. A feeling becomes fantastic when it floats free of any particular person. Someone can be moved to tears by the sufferings of humanity as a whole and be unable to lift a hand for the tired neighbor on the other side of the wall. The feeling belongs to no one in particular, and it costs nothing. It is a sentiment that has come loose from the self that was supposed to be having it.

The second example is knowledge, and the author puts it with unusual force. The law for the growth of a self, he says, is that the more it knows, the more it should know itself. The increase of knowledge ought to match the increase of self-knowledge. If it does not, the knowledge grows into a vast mass of inhuman learning. A human being's self is used up in acquiring it, like the slaves who were put to work building a pyramid or sent down a mine. There is a hit here at the learning of his own age, the great systems that could explain the whole of history and had nothing to say to the person who had to live a particular life.

The third example is the will. A will becomes fantastic when it wills something great and forgets the task that lies directly in front of it. A man decides to transform the world and cannot answer the letter on his desk. The great project is always in the future and the present duty is always beneath him, and in the meantime there is nobody in the room.

He adds a fourth case, which is religion. Even the relation to God, he says, can turn fantastic, and produce a kind of intoxication with the infinite in which the person is lost. They are so full of the thought of God that they cannot come back to being a particular creature with particular work to do. The author was a religious writer, and the warning is aimed at religion first.

From inside, the two failures feel like opposite virtues. The airy person thinks the practical one is dull and earthbound. The practical person thinks the airy one is foolish and unreliable. Each despises the other, and each is mistaken in the same way, since each has let half of the synthesis go.

The disturbing thing about this despair is that it can look like something admirable. A person of this kind may be thought visionary, generous, spiritual or brilliant. They may function perfectly well in daily life. The author says that nobody notices, in any deeper sense, that they lack a self. They have as much of one as anyone else seems to have, as far as the outside world can tell.

The second way is the opposite. The despair of finitude is the despair of lacking the infinite. Here the person is not blown away but weighed down. They have become so completely finite that nothing in them reaches past the facts of their situation.

The author describes it in a series of pictures that have stayed in the minds of his readers. The person of this kind, he says, has become a number. They are one man more, one more repetition of the same old sameness. They have been ground smooth, like a pebble on the beach, or like a coin worn down in circulation until the face is gone. They do not dare to believe in themselves. It seems to them too risky, too different, too much like sticking out. They find it far easier and safer to be like the others, and so they become an imitation, a copy, a unit in the crowd.

Here stands the sentence for which the book is best known to the general reader. Of all the ways of losing something, the author says, losing oneself is the quietest. Lose an arm or a leg or a sum of money or a wife, and the world notices at once. Lose yourself, and there is no sound at all. Nobody comes to the door, and there is no gap at the table. The loss can go on for decades without anyone, including the person, registering it.

Picture a man in his fifties, well regarded and comfortably off. A friend asks what he would do with a free year, and he finds that he has no answer. It is not that the answer is hard to choose. It is that he has never wanted anything the world did not want for him first. He has been a good son, a good husband, a good employee, and he has come to the question of his own wishes as a stranger comes to a town.

The reason for the silence is that the world is glad to be rid of the peculiar. A society gives its rewards to those who fit in and its mild punishments to those who do not, and a self is precisely the thing that does not fit entirely. So the person who does not venture is praised for being sensible. The author calls the attitude shrewd, and he notes that it is a shrewdness that never takes risks. Not to venture, he says, seems the safest course. Yet it is the most dangerous, since by not venturing one loses oneself.

And the person who has lost themselves in this way can keep everything the world values. They can be a good parent and a respected citizen, prosperous and trusted. They can even sit in church each week and be taken for a model believer. They have all the forms of a life and nothing behind them. The world has paid them in full, and they have handed over the one thing that was not for sale.

The author states the healthy movement in a single sentence. To become oneself, he says, is to become concrete. To become concrete is neither to become finite nor to become infinite, since what is to become concrete is a synthesis. The course of becoming therefore has two halves. It is an endless moving away from oneself, in imagination and aspiration, and an endless coming back to oneself, in particular work and particular loves. A self that only goes out is lost in the air, and a self that never goes out is lost in the ground.

The ship needs its ballast and its sail. The author does not rank the two failures, and he does not suggest that the airy person is nobler than the heavy one. Both have lost the balance, and both have lost it quietly. What they share is that neither has been asked, in years, who it is that is living their life.

Chapter 9: Possibility, Necessity and Despair

A man keeps his options open for twenty years. He might become a painter or a doctor. He might become a farmer or a father or a man of the sea. Each of those remains equally possible because he has never chosen one. Each choice would shut off the others, and so he chooses nothing and the years pass. At forty-five he is still a person who could be anything, and he has become nobody in particular. The possibilities were real. The time to use them was spent in looking at them. Readers of old plays will think of the prince of Denmark, who can imagine every outcome of an action so clearly that he cannot perform any of them. He is a figure of exactly this despair, a mind so rich in possibilities that it has no room left for a deed.

That man is living out the second pair in the synthesis, and the pair has failures of its own, which are easy to recognize because nearly everyone has been tempted by both. Necessity is what a person has to be. Possibility is what a person might become. The self lives where the two meet, and it can lose itself by running off into possibility or by sinking into necessity.

His case is what the author calls possibility's despair, the despair of lacking necessity. A self in this condition has become an abstract possibility. It tries itself out in imagination, wearing one future after another, and it never settles into any. The author says that it gets farther and farther from itself, until the possibilities swallow it and there is nobody left to be anything.

The same failure has a darker form. Possibility can frighten as easily as it can dazzle. A mind that has lost its grip on necessity can picture every possible disaster, in vivid detail, with nothing in its actual situation to set against the pictures. The author describes the self as being swallowed by the fear of a possible evil. The evil has not happened and may never happen, but the self has come to live in it, and the actual life around the person stands empty.

The author gives the faculty that makes possibility available a large place. Imagination, he says, is the capacity for all capacities. It is what lets a person see themselves as other than they are, and so to hope, to plan, to repent and to change. The intensity of a person's imagination, he adds, decides the intensity of their self. It is not a luxury for poets. It is the organ by which a self looks past its own present.

What the self is missing in both cases is a limit. The word the author uses for what limits it is necessity, and he is firm that necessity is a good thing for a self. A river with no banks is not freer than a river with banks. It is a swamp. To become oneself, he says elsewhere, is to become concrete. To be concrete is to be this person, here, with this history and these duties and this body. The possible has to be tied to the actual before it can be real.

The opposite failure is necessity's despair, the despair of lacking possibility. Here the self has hardened. Everything has become necessary, fixed, settled, and the person can no longer imagine that anything might be otherwise. The author's name for the extreme form is the fatalist, but the feeling is very common in milder dress. It is the feeling that what happens was always going to happen, that nothing a person does makes any difference, that this is simply how things are and how they will always be.

Think of how people speak when a hard diagnosis arrives, or a betrayal, or a business collapses. One kind of speech says, this is the end, there is nothing to be done, it is what it is. It sounds like realism and often passes for wisdom. The author hears something else in it, the sound of a person who has lost the power to hope in anything that has not already happened. A sealed situation is a dead one, and a self that lives in a sealed situation suffocates.

That is exactly his image. Possibility, he says, is for the self what oxygen is for breathing. A self without possibility cannot draw breath, and the fatalist is like a person locked in an airless room, who does not even know that there is a door. He adds that such a person has lost God along with the self, and the reason is that prayer assumes the situation is not sealed. Whoever says that everything is necessary has nothing to ask for, and no one to ask.

The author has a third figure, who is the most comfortable and therefore the most telling. He is the philistine, and he is necessity's despair in a cheerful and respectable form. The philistine has no imagination. He lives by what is probable, by the way things have always gone, by what is done and what is not done. His whole life is built inside a circle of trivial expectations, and he is content there. He is tranquilized, the author says, by the trivial.

The philistine's sayings are easy to recognize. People like us do not do that. That is not how it is done. Things like that never happen. Every such remark treats the possible as a small, safe set of things that have happened before. A man of this kind may be honest and kind and entirely decent. He has simply never had a thought that fell outside the pattern, and when something outside the pattern does happen, to him or to someone he loves, he has no resources at all. The author says that he has lost himself and God in the same way the fatalist did, though without ever feeling the loss.

Against both figures the author sets the believer. The believer, he says, has an eternally sure antidote to despair, and the antidote is possibility. The reason is that for God everything is possible, at every moment. The sentence is not an easy one, and he says openly what it costs. When a situation is humanly certain to end in destruction, the believer is the person who still holds that it need not, and who holds it not from optimism but from a conviction about what reality is at bottom. He puts the paradox in his own words when he says that to believe is to lose one's understanding in order to gain God.

Someone who does not share the faith can still see what the sentence forbids. It forbids treating any situation as permanently sealed, and any future as closed. A patient who has been told that the odds are against them, and who goes on planning next year's garden, is doing a small version of what the sentence asks, and nobody thinks the less of them for it. It also does not dissolve necessity. The believer still has a body, a history and a limit, and the author never asks anyone to pretend otherwise. What the sentence secures is the second lung. A self needs both, the ground beneath its feet and the air above its head, and despair is whatever happens when one of the two is lost.

Chapter 10: Unconscious Despair and the Cellar

To show a despair that does not know itself, the author describes a house. It has three floors, a cellar, a ground floor and an upper floor, arranged so that the people on the different floors have different standing. A human being is such a house, he says. It was built with a view to being spirit, which means that the top floor is where a person is meant to live. But the sad and comic fact is that the majority prefer the cellar. They live among the senses. They live in comfort and appetite, in what can be touched and tasted and possessed, and they are perfectly at ease there.

The cellar, of course, is a real part of the house, and nothing in the picture says that appetite is wicked. The trouble is the address. A person can eat well and love well and work well in the cellar, and never once climb the stairs to see what else the building holds. The middle floor is the ordinary mental life of feelings and opinions, and the top floor is the place from which a person looks at their whole life and asks what it is for. Many people have simply never been up there.

The author adds a detail that makes the picture more than a joke. If someone were to invite such a person to come upstairs, he says, the person would be offended. They would take it as an insult. They are not at all unhappy in the cellar, and they resent the suggestion that they should move. The resentment is part of the evidence, since a person who was simply comfortable would be amused, not angry.

He has a second image of the same fault, aimed at the philosophers. A thinker, he says, builds an enormous palace of ideas, a system that explains the whole of existence and of world history. Then one looks at the thinker's own life and finds, to one's amazement, that he does not live in the palace at all. He lives in a shed beside it, or in a dog kennel, or at best in the porter's lodge. What the man thinks and what the man is stand at opposite ends of the garden. The author is thinking of the great systems of his own day, but the type is permanent. It includes anyone whose beliefs are grander than the life they are actually living.

Why should ignorance of despair count as despair? The answer follows from the structure. A self that does not know it is a self cannot stand in the right relation to itself, because it does not know there is a relation to be kept. The ignorance is itself the misrelation, and a particularly thorough one. The author insists that this is not a side case. He suspects it is the most widespread form of all, and he suspects also that it is the form that is furthest from a cure.

It would be a mistake to picture the cellar dweller as stupid. He may be very clever. He may run a firm, win arguments, raise a fine family and follow the news with understanding. The author's word for what he lacks is spirit, and in this sense the lack has nothing to do with intelligence. It is the lack of the habit of standing back and asking what all this cleverness is for. A very sharp mind can live in the cellar for a whole life.

Ask such a person whether they are happy, and the answer comes at once, and it is yes. It comes so fast that nothing in it has been weighed. There is no pause in which the question was turned over and a true answer looked for. The author would say that the speed is the symptom. A person who has never looked inside has no reason to hesitate.

He gives a name to the person who lives at the level of the cellar, and the name is the immediate man. For such a person, the self is defined entirely from outside. It is found in possessions, in a spouse, in a job, in the things that can be pointed to. Ask the immediate man who he is, and he will tell you what he owns and what he does. He does not have an inner answer, because nothing in him has ever stood back to ask.

When misfortune arrives, the immediate man locates it entirely outside himself. The world has been unfair, or an enemy has done him harm, or luck has turned, and what he wants is for the outside to be put right. Give him back the lost thing and all is well. He does not suspect that the loss has shown him something about the ground he stood on. The author's account of him is therefore not contemptuous but sad. He is a person to whom the most important thing has never been introduced.

The author gives a neat picture of what this looks like when trouble comes. The immediate man, in his distress, may wish that he were someone else. He wishes it the way he might wish for a new coat. He imagines that a self can be swapped as easily as clothing, and that he could step out of this one and into another. The author finds the idea infinitely comic, since a person who believes it has taken the clothes for the body, and the body for the man. The comedy and the pathos are the same. The wish to be somebody else is, in its simplest form, only the wish to change one's coat.

There is also a historical remark in this section, and it carries a sting. The pagan world, the author says, lacked the concept of a self before God, and its people were in this way in despair without knowing it. He then says that the same is true of a great many people in a country where everyone has been baptized. The word Christian, he thinks, had become a label stuck on people who had never considered being a self at all. This is not contempt for any particular person. It is a complaint about a society that had made the word easy.

Between the cellar and the top floor there are many steps, and a person is seldom on only one of them. The faint unease that many people carry is already a step up from complete ignorance. A single honest conversation can move someone up another. The same person may live on the top floor in one matter and in the cellar in another. The author's picture is of a staircase, not of two camps.

Then the author turns the ladder upside down. The more a person knows about their condition, he says, the more intense the despair, because awareness is a form of depth. The most intense despair of all, in his account, belongs to the devil, who is pure spirit and who sees the whole situation with perfect clarity and will not change. But the same awareness is also the beginning of the cure. A person who admits that they are not well feels worse than before, and is also nearer to help. It is better, he thinks, to be in despair and to know it than to be in despair and to go through life without noticing.

The author is at his most cheerful in this passage, and the cheerfulness is part of the diagnosis. It is easy to laugh at the man in the cellar. It is harder to ask how many times one has come up for air.

Chapter 11: Despair Over the Earthly and Oneself

Once a person knows that they are in despair, the book says, the sickness splits into two. One kind is the despair of not willing to be oneself. The other is the despair of willing, against all odds, to be oneself. The first is called the despair of weakness, and it is the gentler and more familiar of the two.

The author divides weakness itself into two stages. In the first, the person despairs over something earthly. In the second, they despair over the eternal, or over themselves. The difference between the stages is the difference between looking at the loss and looking at the one who has suffered it.

Begin with the first. The person in this stage is the immediate man of the cellar, who has been touched by trouble. His self has been resting on something in the world, a person or a position or a fortune, and the thing is taken from him. He reacts as anyone would, and he says that it is over, that he has lost everything. The author does not find the feeling absurd. To the man it is the simple truth, because the thing was his whole ground.

What marks this stage is the hope that the loss can be undone. The man waits. He waits for the lost person to return, or for the reversal of fortune, or for some miracle that will set the earthly world back the way it was. The author compares his state to a child that has lost a toy and cannot be interested in anything else until it is found. The child is not stupid. The toy really was the world.

Fiction has a famous picture of it. A woman is jilted on her wedding morning, and she stops every clock in the house at that minute. She goes on wearing the dress for decades, with the cake rotting on the table, as if the world could be held at the moment before the loss until the lost thing came back. It is a vivid image of the first stage, a self nailed to the hour when its ground was taken.

Someone can live in that waiting for years. A person keeps a dead parent's room just as it was. A man goes on rehearsing a speech to a partner who left long ago. A woman cannot take a job in another town because a letter might still come. The earthly thing is gone, and the self has been left standing at its door. The author would say that what these people are in despair over is not the loss as such. It is that they have no other address.

There are also the ones who recover, and the author is cautious about them. The immediate man who is given time may get over the loss in the ordinary way. The pain wears down, new interests arrive, a new attachment takes the place of the old, and he is cheerful again. The author does not sneer at this. He simply asks what has changed. If the man has only found another coat, then the same despair is waiting in the new one, and it will come out again the next time the ground gives way. A recovery that is only a change of support is not yet a cure.

The second stage begins when the person notices what the first stage concealed. The despair has been about the earthly thing, but it was always about the self that depended on the earthly thing, and the person can see it. They are in despair over their weakness. They see that they put all their weight on something that could not bear it, and they cannot forgive themselves for it. They may also see that they still cannot let go.

The author calls this despair over the eternal, and the phrase needs a gloss for anyone who does not share his vocabulary. The eternal, in this sense, is whatever in a person ought to have come first, the part that is not at the mercy of events. To despair over the eternal is to see that one has sold that part cheaply. It is the state of a person who knows that they have bartered their integrity for something small. It may have been their peace of mind or some other large good. Either way they are sick with the knowledge.

A man betrays a friend to win a promotion. Years later the promotion has long since lost its shine, and he cannot bear either the office or the memory. He cannot apologize, because an apology would mean admitting how cheaply he sold what mattered. He cannot forget, because the thing he sold was the part of himself that would have told him what to do. That is despair over the eternal in the author's sense, and it has almost nothing to do with guilt as a feeling. It is the discovery that the one who did it is the one who has to go on.

Here the despair turns on the self. The person hates their own weakness. They say that they are the kind of person who falls to pieces, who gives in, who never learns, and they say it with a disgust they cannot hide. They want to be rid of the weakness. The book's formula for all despair shows up in the open, with the self wanting to be rid of itself. There is an extra twist in the case. The person also wants to get rid of the weakness by their own strength, and will not take any help. They would rather be strong alone than be carried. The self that hates its weakness is also the self that is too proud to be helped.

The author's most original observation in this section is about what such a person does with the secret. The person shuts it up inside. He keeps it from everyone, and the author's word for the state is sealed reserve. Nobody is told. The despairing person goes about among his friends, smiling and competent, and has a locked room in him that no one has entered. It may be that he is ashamed, or afraid of being pitied, or simply certain that no one could understand. He talks about other things, and the talk is often brilliant.

The author is careful to separate this from privacy. A person who says that they would rather not talk about something is exercising a right, and the door can be opened when they choose. Shutting up is different, since the door has been bolted from inside and the person no longer has the key. Privacy protects a self. Sealed reserve traps one.

The habit has consequences. A person who is shut up often works very hard, since work keeps the door bolted. He may become a model of duty and efficiency. He may also look for noise, for any occupation that leaves no room for the room inside. The author notes that such a person cannot be reached by ordinary kindness, because ordinary kindness does not know where to knock. The secret has become the one thing he has that belongs to him alone, and it has also become his prison.

The book uses labels for the two halves of conscious despair, feminine for weakness and masculine for defiance. Those labels belong to its century, and readers of a later age tend to wince at them. The author softens them at once. A man can despair in the so-called feminine way and a woman in the so-called masculine way, he says, and the labels are only a rough guide. What matters is the distinction beneath them. The person who despairs from weakness has a streak of defiance, and the defiant person has a streak of weakness, and each can turn into the other without warning.

Chapter 12: Defiance: Willing to Be Oneself

Defiance looks at first like health. A person wills to be themselves. They do not flinch from the self and they do not hide it. They say that they will be exactly who they are, and that nobody will tell them otherwise. The author gives it the name defiance, and he says that it is the most intense form of the sickness so far.

What makes it despair is the way the self is willed. It is willed in defiance of whatever set it up. The person does not wish to be the self that was given, with its talents and limits, its history and its debts. They wish to be master of the self, to make it, to decide what will belong to it and what will not. They want to begin from a self of their own choosing and to rule it as an absolute sovereign.

The difficulty is that a self cannot begin anywhere except where it is. It cannot start sooner than with its concrete self, the one that has a particular past and particular faults and a particular family. The defiant person therefore cannot actually become the self they have in mind. They can only imagine it. The author's name for what they are doing is imaginary construction, and he gives a picture of how it feels from inside. The self treats itself as an experiment. It adds a little here, removes a little there, and keeps the parts that please it. It is like a writer who can cross out any chapter of his own life that he dislikes.

The trouble with the writer's method is that life has already been written. The chapters that were crossed out are still there, in the body, in the memory, in other people's faces. So the self that has been constructed in the imagination is always a fiction laid over the actual one, and the actual one goes on underneath, unchanged and unforgiven.

The author's best phrase for the result is the image of a king without a country. The defiant self sits on a throne and calls itself absolute lord of its realm. But the realm is empty. Its only subjects are the thoughts the self has about itself. It rules over a theory of itself, and the theory obeys because it has no other choice. The self is sovereign and has nothing to govern.

The shape is easy to see in small cases. A person declares that they will never ask anyone for anything, and they do not, even in a real emergency, because asking would admit that they are not their own foundation. A person nurses a grievance for thirty years and refuses every chance to let it go, because letting it go would feel like saying that the injury did not matter. A person keeps revising the story of their life so that every unpleasant stretch of it is found to have been somebody else's doing. In each case the self insists on being its own author and will not be the creature it was handed.

Then the author reaches the darkest part of the analysis. Imagine someone who carries a great and lasting torment, he says, a hurt they cannot cure. The hurt could be eased, if they would accept help from outside themselves, from the power that set them up. But the defiant person will not. They would rather be themselves with the torment than be relieved of it by giving in. More than that, they want to keep the torment, because it is their evidence. They hold it up against the whole of existence as a proof that existence is wrong.

Readers of Milton will recognize the figure. The fallen angel in his poem says that it is better to rule in hell than to serve in heaven, and the line has been admired for centuries as a statement of pride. The author's account suggests what lies under the admiration. A person who prefers hell on their own terms to heaven on someone else's has made a protest of their whole existence.

The author calls this the demonic form of despair, and he says it with care. He is not mocking anyone who suffers, and he does not suggest that pain is unreal or that a person in agony should simply be grateful. His point is about what can happen to suffering when it becomes a case to be won. The pain stops being something that is endured and becomes something that is used. It turns into an argument, and to drop the argument would be to lose the only thing the person has to show. So the person keeps the hurt open and keeps presenting it.

A comparison with the weak despair just described shows how the two are related. The weak person cannot bear to be themselves and wants to escape. The defiant person insists on being themselves and wants to be in charge. Both have a false relation to the self that was given, and both would be astonished to hear that they are in the same sickness. The defiant person has, if anything, more awareness than the weak one. They know they have a self, they know it is infinite in worth, and they know what they want. That is why the despair is more intense, and why it is farther from help. A person who has no need of anything has nothing to ask for.

What keeps a person from simply being who they are? Defiance supplies part of the reply, and it is a more uncomfortable part than weakness did. To be oneself in the full sense would mean accepting the parts one did not choose and cannot cut out. There is the family and the body. There are the failures and the mistakes already made. It would mean agreeing to begin with the actual self and not the self of one's dreams. The defiant person will not agree, and finds that there is nothing else on offer.

A reader may be reminded of the old ideal of self-mastery, the mind that answers to no one and is moved by nothing outside it. The book's logic would put the difference in one place. A person can master their own reactions and still be refusing the fact that they were given a self at all. Self-command is one thing. The claim to have made oneself is another, and the second is the part that turns sour.

In its last stage, defiance is not only against help. It is against being at all. The person's rage is at the whole arrangement of things that allowed them to be hurt. The author says that the rage is aimed at existence itself, and at the good in it, since goodness is a standing rebuke. The despair has become a protest against the world, and it keeps itself going by finding new evidence.

What makes this form hard to spot is that the world often admires it. A person who refuses help, who answers to no one and who never explains or complains looks like strength of character. The author's diagnosis is that this strength is a posture held by force, and that the force is the sickness. The world calls it independence, and gives it medals.

Chapter 13: Kierkegaard and Anti-Climacus

Copenhagen was a small city, and in it a writer could become a public joke. In the middle of the eighteen forties, a satirical weekly began to draw the city's best-known philosopher as a figure of fun. It gave him a thin pair of legs and trousers of different lengths, and it printed the pictures again and again. Soren Kierkegaard was walking the same streets that the pictures mocked, and he was a man who could not stay indoors.

He had been born in that city in eighteen thirteen, the youngest of seven children. His father was a prosperous wool merchant who retired early and spent his later years in religious brooding. The old man was devout and melancholy, and he had a sense of guilt that he never explained. A family story, which no one has been able to confirm, says that as a poor shepherd boy on a bleak heath he had once cursed God. Whatever the truth of it, the household was heavy. Several of the children died young, and their mother died while Kierkegaard was a student. His father died a few years later, and the inheritance that came with that death gave the son the means to be a writer for the rest of his short life.

He studied theology at the university in his home city, and he earned his degree with a thesis on the irony of Socrates. He was not a clergyman and never became one. He lived in rented rooms and wrote at a high desk, standing up, and in the afternoons he walked the streets of Copenhagen for hours, stopping to talk with shopkeepers and cab drivers and whoever else would talk.

At twenty-seven he became engaged to a young woman named Regine Olsen. A year later he broke the engagement and gave the ring back. The reasons he gave over the years do not agree with each other. He spoke of his melancholy, of a calling that would not fit into a marriage, and of a secret he could not share. She pleaded with him, and he would not change his mind. Soon afterward he left for Berlin, and he began to write with a speed that astonished those who knew him. She married another man a few years later. He never stopped thinking about her, and it would be unwise to guess what lay behind any particular page of his work.

The books came fast and mostly under false names. A book on the choice between a life of pleasure and a life of duty came first. Then came a book on Abraham and the sacrifice of his son, a book on anxiety, and a book on whether truth can be learned from another person. Each carried a different invented author. The authors disagreed with one another and sometimes with the man whose name stood on the spine. He liked to say that the pseudonyms were a way of speaking without claiming to be the speaker. The reader, he thought, would then have to make up their own mind.

The weekly that mocked him had been provoked, and he knew it. He had written a sharp public letter against it, hoping, in a way, to be attacked. What came was worse than he had guessed. The caricatures were printed for months, and boys shouted at him in the street. He said later that the mockery had turned him into a public figure who could no longer walk in peace. It made him more serious, and it drove him further into writing about what a person is when the crowd has decided who they are.

In the spring of eighteen forty-eight something changed. His journal notes a turning point of a religious kind, and from that time he treated everything he had written as a service to Christianity. He wrote a short account of his own work as an author, explaining that all of it had been aimed at one task. The Sickness unto Death was written that year. It is the most systematic of his books, and in a way the most personal, since it carries his lifelong subject in its barest form.

The year of the book's appearance was a year of upheaval in Denmark. The old absolute monarchy had been brought to an end only two months earlier, by a constitution that gave the country an elected parliament, and the streets were full of talk about the will of the people. Kierkegaard was not an enemy of reform, but he distrusted the crowd. Three years before, in a long review of a novel, he had made an argument about the press and public opinion. An age ruled by them, he said, wears down the individual. A person who is always one of the public is never answerable as a single self. The sentences about being ground smooth in the crowd had a history.

The name on its title page is Anti-Climacus. It answers a name he had used before. An earlier invented author, called Climacus, had described himself as a man who was not a Christian and who looked at Christianity from outside. The new name stood at the opposite end. Anti-Climacus was meant to be a Christian of an extraordinary kind, a person who met the highest standard of the faith without flinching. Kierkegaard wrote that the book was pitched higher than he could claim to have climbed himself, and this is the reason he gave for not putting his own name on it. He took the modest role of editor.

The choice had effects on the tone of the book. A man who writes from a height does not need to explain his own struggles. He describes the sickness as a physician does, from outside and with authority, and the reader feels at once the cold of the method and the concern beneath it. A book signed by Kierkegaard might have been a confession. A book signed by Anti-Climacus is an examination.

The author of this exposition had by then begun to see the establishment of his own country's church as part of the sickness, and in the last year of his life he said so in public pamphlets. He collapsed in the street in the autumn of eighteen fifty-five and died in a Copenhagen hospital in November, at forty-two. The inheritance that had paid for his books was almost gone.

Chapter 14: Despair Is Sin: Before God

Despair is sin. With those three words the second part of the book changes the ground. A listener who has followed the first part as a study of inner life may feel a door swing open onto a different room. The author does not see it as a different room. He sees it as the same one, looked at in a stronger light.

His definition is exact. Sin, he says, is to be in despair before God, either not willing to be oneself or willing to be oneself. Put that beside the two forms of conscious despair in the first part, and nothing has been added except three words. Before God is the only difference between despair and sin. The sickness has not changed. What has changed is the audience in front of which it takes place.

To show why that can matter so much, the author describes what he calls the gradations in the consciousness of the self. A self, he says, is always measured against something, and the measure decides what kind of self it is. A man who stands directly before his cattle and has nothing else as a measure is a very low self. A master who stands before his slaves is hardly a self at all, because slaves cannot serve as a true measure, and a person who has no real measure has no real shape. A child who has only his parents as a measure becomes more of a self as an adult when the state becomes his measure. The more there is in the measure, the more there is in the self.

Then comes the step on which the whole part depends. What happens, he asks, when the measure is God? The answer is that an infinite accent falls on the self. A person who exists before God is a self in the fullest possible sense, because the measure against which they are held is infinite. And in the same act the weight of every failure is raised to the same power. The despair that would be sad, or foolish, or merely unfortunate before an earthly standard becomes sin before an absolute one.

Everyone knows a small version of the effect. The same careless remark can mean very little said to a neighbor, and a great deal said to a dying friend, and something different again said in front of a judge. The act is the same, but its weight changes with who stands before it. The author's claim is that the change of weight is not a private feeling but a fact about the situation, and that the largest possible audience gives the largest possible weight.

One result is uncomfortable, and the author states it without softening. Awareness raises intensity, so a person who understands that they stand before God sins more deeply when they despair than a person who has no idea of such a standing. The pagan world, he says, did not know what sin was in this full sense. It knew wrongdoing and folly and shame, and it lacked the word for the third thing. The Christian, who does know, is under a heavier charge.

A reader who does not believe in God can still see what kind of structure this is. A self needs a measure. If the measure is the crowd, the self is crowd-sized. If the measure is one's own mood, the self is as shifting as the mood. To have a stable and deep self, the author argues, there must be a measure that cannot be flattered, bargained with or outgrown. The book names that measure God, and it says that the self that stands before God has a worth no other standard can give it. The worth and the weight arrive together.

This is also where the author takes up an old question with Socrates. Socrates held that no one does wrong knowingly. The person who does wrong, on his view, does so out of ignorance, and to teach them the good is to cure them. The author admires the thought and says that it is exactly half right. He agrees that a person who does wrong often does not understand what they are doing. But he asks a question that Socrates did not ask, which is why the person does not understand.

His answer is that the ignorance is usually willed. Many people have not looked at the matter because they did not want to see it. Think of someone who has not opened a bank statement in months. They can say truthfully that they do not know how bad the figures are. But the not knowing is an achievement, and it was carried out with some effort. The author's view is that much of what passes for ignorance of the good has the same structure. A person knows enough to look away. Sin, in this light, is not primarily a lack of knowledge. It is a turning of the will against what a person could see.

The author adds that this way of understanding sin cannot be reached by reason alone. A person who reasons carefully about human conduct can discover folly, cruelty and weakness. The idea that these are offenses against an absolute, and that the whole self stands in debt, is not something that careful reasoning turns up. In his view it has to be told to a person, and the Christian teaching is that it was told.

It follows that sin is not mainly a matter of separate bad acts. A person may commit no crime and keep every rule, and still stand in the state the author calls sin, which is the state of a self that has not rested on its source. Sin is a condition of the relation, the same one described throughout the first part, and the individual sins are its symptoms. Most of the tradition's lists of sins would, in this view, be lists of rashes.

That brings the author to the sentence that most readers of the book remember, and it is the book's keynote in this part. The opposite of sin, he says, is not virtue. It is faith. Nearly everyone would expect the opposite answer. Virtue is what most moral traditions set against vice, and a person who lives well is ordinarily thought to be free of sin. The author says that this mistakes the matter. A person can be honest, generous and brave and still be in despair, if the honesty rests on pride in being honest, and the generosity on a wish to be seen as generous. Virtue is about what a person does. Faith is about what the person rests on. The Gospels give the picture in a parable of two men at prayer. One thanks God that he is not like other people, and he lists his virtues, and every item on the list is true. The other can only say that he has failed. The story is told so that the listener will be uncomfortable about which of the two is better related to God, and the discomfort is what the author is after.

The author borrows a line from the apostle Paul to make the point, in a letter to the church at Rome. Whatever is not of faith, it says, is sin. He takes the sentence as the most exact definition of sin the tradition has.

Chapter 15: Sin Continues: Despair Over Sin

A sin is not something that happens once and is over. That is the author's next claim, and it changes how the whole subject looks. In his account sin is a state, and the state goes on. A person who has stood in it for a day has sinned for a day. A person who has stood in it for a year has sinned for a year. Each new stretch of time without a turning is itself a new act.

Take a man who cheated a business partner long ago and has never spoken of it. The cheating took an afternoon. The silence has lasted thirty years, and on the author's reckoning every one of those years is a further act, since in each of them the man could have turned and did not.

The simplest picture is a debt. A debt does not stay the same size while it is ignored. It grows with every day it is left unpaid. The author says that the continuance of sin is the real sin, and the first act is only its beginning. What matters most is not the wrong that was done at the start, but the long refusal that follows it.

He also insists that sin is not a mere lack. A familiar way of speaking describes evil as an absence of good, as darkness is an absence of light. The author says that this makes sin sound passive, like a hole in the road. It is active. Sin is a position that a person takes up before God, and it is held in place by the will. A person who stays in it is not failing to do something. They are doing something, namely refusing.

The first form of this continuance is the one that surprises readers most. It is despair over one's sin. A person sees what they have done and is overwhelmed by it. They are consumed by shame. They punish themselves in their thoughts, they swear to be better, they say that they are hopeless. Everyone would call this repentance, and the author says that it is not.

His reason is that the sorrow is about the wrong person. The one who despairs over his sin, he says, is usually grieving that he has turned out to be the sort of man who sins. What hurts is not chiefly what he did to another, or to God. It is what the deed shows about him. He had a picture of himself as a person too good for such a fall, and the picture has broken. The pain of remorse is, in this case, the pain of hurt pride. The author suggests that behind the despairing sinner's wish never to have sinned there may be a wish to go on admiring himself.

An everyday example makes the point clear. A person breaks a resolution they had held for years and is wretched about it. They say again and again that they cannot believe they did it, that they are better than this. The phrase gives the game away. The surprise is the sign of an unexamined self-regard, since a person who had never doubted that they could fall would not be so amazed by the fall. True sorrow for a wrong attends to the wrong, and to whoever was harmed. Despair over sin attends to the self.

It may seem harsh to say this of remorse. The author does not condemn the pain. He asks only where the pain is pointed. An apology can be turned toward the person who was hurt, and it then asks nothing for itself. Or it can be turned back toward the one apologizing. Then it says, in effect, look how terrible I feel, and waits to be comforted. The wronged person is asked to console the one who wronged them. Sorrow of the second kind has the shape of despair over sin, however sincere it feels, since all its attention returns to the self.

The author describes a second path, which is flight. A person who has done wrong often begins, quietly, to avoid anything that might call it up. They stay away from the friend they injured. They turn conversations aside whenever they come near the subject. They steer clear of the kind of book, the kind of person, the kind of hour in which the matter might surface. The sealed reserve described earlier deepens here into a fear of the good itself, for the good is by this time the thing that would demand a change. The sinner wants to be left alone with the sin.

A third path is to put the matter in the past and go on. That was a long time ago, the person says. It was a different phase of life, and nobody is the same person after twenty years. It is over and done with, and no good can come of digging it up. The author replies that time cannot do what is being asked of it. A deed may be finished in time while the person who did it has not turned, and the eternal in a person does not forget. The passing years make the wrong look further off, and they do not touch the stance that chose it.

A fourth path is the new leaf. The person resolves to do better, and does better, and feels clean. There is nothing wrong with doing better, and the author would never discourage it. What troubles him is the belief that the clean feeling comes from the person's own effort and settles the account. A self that mends itself by its own strength is back at the self-made ideal from the first part of the book, the claim to be one's own source. It has swapped one form of pride for another.

What interrupts the continuance? The author's answer is only repentance, and he does not mean a feeling. He means a turn. A person who sins and does not turn is deeper in with every day. A person who turns, even once and even late, has stepped out of the line. The turn is not a payment for the past, and it does not undo anything that happened. It changes the direction of the stance, which is the only thing that was ever being asked.

All four paths have a common feature. Each tries to deal with the sin from within the same self that committed it, and each keeps the self in charge. The author's suggestion is that the sin cannot be dealt with in that way, because the trouble is the self's hold on itself. To be released, a person would have to be stopped and turned around by something outside.

A sign of the condition suggests itself from all this. The person deepest in it is likely to be the one who flinches when the word forgiveness is spoken.

Chapter 16: Despair of Forgiveness and Offense

A story in the Gospels shows what is hard about being forgiven. A young man has taken his share of the family property and wasted it in a distant country, and he ends up feeding pigs. He decides to go home. On the road he rehearses a speech, in which he will say that he has sinned, that he is no longer worthy to be called a son, and that his father should treat him as a hired hand. While he is still far off, his father sees him and runs. The son begins the speech. The father interrupts and calls for a robe and a ring.

Notice how much the son has prepared, and what he has prepared for. He has planned to be punished, and he has made his own terms. It does not occur to him that the father might simply take him back. The author's section on the despair of forgiveness is about people who stay in the far country, and about the ones who go home and are unable to accept the robe.

The author places this form of despair above all the others so far. A person who despairs over their sin is looking at themselves. A person who despairs of forgiveness has already looked at God. They have seen their sin as a sin before the absolute, and they have heard that forgiveness is on offer. And they have refused it. In an odd way they have come closer to faith than the others, because the matter has been made fully clear to them. They stand at the point where a person either believes or is offended.

The author's word for the refusal is offense, and he means by it what the word meant in the older sense of a stumbling block, something a person trips over. To be offended is to be unable to take what is held out. The man who says that his sin cannot be forgiven believes that he is being humble. He sees himself as a person of such terrible guilt that no mercy could reach him. The author calls this humility a mask. Behind it he finds a very large claim, that the man's sin is bigger than God's mercy. He has set his own wrongdoing above the power to forgive it, and he has decided what the limits of that power are. It is pride, wearing the clothes of a penitent.

A familiar example can sit beside the author's. A person who has done something shameful says that they are beyond help. They say it with weary dignity, and friends find it hard to argue. But notice what the phrase does. If a person is beyond help, then nothing is asked of them. They need not change, or apologize, or begin again, and no one may expect it. Being beyond help is the most comfortable position in the world for someone who does not wish to move. It also keeps the self in the center of the picture, as the greatest sinner in the room.

There is a related difficulty with receiving any gift that cannot be repaid. People accept presents gladly when they can give something back. When the gift is too great, or when the giver wants nothing, the receiver may feel diminished. Forgiveness is the limit case. By its nature it cannot be earned and cannot be paid for. The word the tradition uses is grace, which means a gift that has no reason except the love of the giver. A self that has built itself on the principle of owing nothing and being nobody's debtor finds grace almost impossible to take. It would rather pay, and pay forever, than be given.

The author notes a logical point that makes the matter harder. A debt cannot be forgiven by the debtor. If a person is guilty, no amount of private resolution can wipe the slate, since the person doing the wiping is the guilty one. Every earlier attempt failed for the same reason, whether it was remorse, flight, forgetting or a new leaf. The self was the only physician present. Forgiveness, if it is to come, has to come from outside. That means it has to come from someone who is not the one in debt, and the person in debt has to be willing to receive it.

Offense, as the author uses the word, is not the same as doubt. A doubter says that they do not know whether the thing is true, and a doubter can be calm. The offended person says that they will not have it. The reaction is of the will and the heart and not only of the mind, and it often comes with heat, a bitterness that goes beyond any argument. That heat is part of what the author means. The thing offered stings because it would require something of the person that they are unwilling to give.

There is a familiar fact about people that shows the sting. Someone who has been forgiven by a friend often feels, along with relief, a flash of resentment toward the friend. The generous act makes the debt visible, and nobody likes being shown what they owe. Some have found that it is easier to be forgiven by someone they have stopped respecting than by someone they love. The pattern is old, and the author would say that it is the shadow of offense falling across a small human occasion.

To the understanding, which is accustomed to balance sheets, the idea is offensive for another reason as well. How can a past wrong be set aside? A wrong done is done. No one can undo it, and justice seems to demand that its weight be carried. The author does not pretend that forgiveness is rational in the ordinary sense. He says that it is a paradox, in that it contradicts the reasoning that would call for payment, and that a person's reaction to it is the test. Either the person believes, or the person is offended. There is nothing in between.

The story has a second son, who is easy to overlook. The older brother has stayed at home and worked the fields and broken no rule. When he comes in from the fields and hears music, he learns that the household is celebrating his brother's return, and he refuses to go in. He is furious. He has served for years, he says, and has never been given a feast. The father comes out to plead with him. The older son is offended at forgiveness too, and for a reason that sounds like justice. He has the virtues, and he cannot bear to see the lack of them rewarded. His offense is the same as the younger son's, turned inside out. Each in his own way is unable to take what is given.

The author describes how the offended person stays in the state. They may seem to be in agony, and in a real sense they are. But the agony has become a home. To accept forgiveness would mean giving up the shape of the sin they have grown used to. They would have to walk out of the far country, and the far country, bad as it is, is the only place where they are certain who they are.

The book sets the two possibilities side by side with no softening. The self before God, once the matter has been laid out, is placed at a crossing. It can receive, or it can take offense, and there is no third door.

Chapter 17: Offense, Christendom and Denial

Imagine an emperor who sends word to a peasant that he would like him for a son-in-law. The author uses the picture to show how an offer can fail by being too large. The peasant will not be delighted. He will be suspicious, and uneasy, and perhaps angry. Is the emperor making fun of him? What could the emperor want with a man like him? A person of that standing is not made to hear that kind of invitation, and the first thing he feels is the pressure of the gap.

The author says that it is exactly so with the invitation at the heart of Christianity. The teaching is that God takes an interest in one particular person. God is the infinite power behind all things, and the person's life is no bigger than a village street. Yet he wishes to stand in a relation to them. The thought is overwhelming, and the author says that it is also offensive. It is hard to believe that the great concerns of existence have anything to do with one's own small faults, and it can feel almost insulting.

The word offense takes on its largest meaning in this part of the book, and the author explains where the occasion for it lies. At the center of the Christian story there is a single human being who is said to be God. The claim is that this person lived as a poor man, was despised, suffered and was put to death, and that he forgave sins. The offense can come from two opposite directions. Some people stumble at the lowliness, since a God who is poor and scorned seems too humble to be God at all. Others stumble at the loftiness, since a mere human being who claims divine authority seems to have claimed too much. The first says that this cannot be God, and the second says that this cannot be a man. The claim is built so that both objections are, in a way, correct about one half of it.

Each element is a stumbling block to the understanding. A human being who says that he is God sounds mad or blasphemous. A God who is poor and beaten sounds like a contradiction. A man who forgives all the wrongs done to other people and to God, simply by saying so, sounds like a man who has given himself the freedom of the universe.

The author adds a subtle observation about the person who is offended. Such a person is often not indifferent. They feel the pull of what they refuse. The offense, he suggests, is a thwarted attraction, the response of someone who is drawn to a thing and cannot allow themselves to be. That is why it comes with heat. A person who is merely unmoved shrugs, and a person who is offended argues.

The author calls this the possibility of offense, and he is careful to say that the possibility is a feature and not a defect. It stands at the door of the faith like a guard. Anyone who is going to believe has to pass it, and the guard asks one thing, which is whether they will take the claim as it is or turn it into something else. A person who passes it is a believer. A person who turns back, because the claim is too much, is offended.

One consequence is that a faith without any possibility of offense would be a smaller thing. If nobody could be put off by what Christianity says, the author suggests, then nothing very large would have been claimed. The size of the offense measures the size of the claim, in the way that the peasant's alarm measures the size of the emperor's rank. A message that causes no stumbling probably does not ask very much.

Here the author permits himself a complaint about his own country. In a land where everyone is baptized and goes to church and counts as a Christian by birth, the possibility of offense has been all but removed. Christianity has become respectable, pleasant and inoffensive. It is preached as a beautiful ideal and a comfort, and nobody is troubled by it. The author's view is that the loss of offense is a loss of the faith itself, since a faith that cannot disturb anyone has stopped saying what it said at the start. His word for the whole condition is Christendom, the name for a country whose religion has turned into a habit, and he does not mean it as a compliment.

It would be easy to take this as an attack on ordinary believers, and the author does not intend it that way. He is describing a danger that attaches to any religion that has been lived in for centuries, which is the slow wearing away of its edge. A coin that passes through many hands loses its face. The author wants the face back, even if the price is that more people are offended.

The author does not try to argue anyone out of being offended, and the omission is deliberate. A physician does not debate with the disease. The book's task is to describe the condition with such exactness that the reader can see where they stand, and then to leave the decision with the reader. A proof would turn the offer into a conclusion, and the offer is meant to be taken or refused as an offer.

The last form of sin in the book is the most extreme, and it follows from everything before it. It is the sin of dismissing Christianity positively as untrue. A person of this kind has not simply failed to believe, or looked away, or gone on being offended in private. They declare, in the open, that the whole thing is a lie. The tradition has a name for the worst of sins, the sin against the Holy Spirit, and the author applies it to this one.

What gives the sin its weight, in his account, is its clarity. The person is not confused. They have understood what is being offered and what it would ask, and they say no with their eyes open. Their despair has reached a stage in which it hates the good and calls it false. It is the opposite of the cellar dweller, who has never seen the stairs. This person has seen them very well, and has resolved to burn them.

Anyone can recognize a small human version of the pattern. A person is offered a gift, or a friendship, or a second chance, and the offer is better than anything they expected. Instead of taking it, they become angry. They find reasons why it cannot be genuine, why the giver has some motive, why it is all a sham. The anger is out of proportion to anything in the offer. The author would say that the size of the anger is the size of the longing, turned inside out.

The book's diagnosis reaches its highest point with this description. It has moved from a person who does not know that they are ill, through the weak and the defiant, to someone who has been shown the whole of the cure and has refused it. Nothing in the account softens the picture.

Chapter 18: Faith: Resting in the Power

The book gives its cure in a single sentence, and it gives it more than once.

In relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

Hearing that after a whole book of diagnosis can feel like a letdown, since it sounds so quiet. It repays slow handling. Each clause answers one of the ways the book has shown the self going wrong, and the grammar is exact.

Begin with the first half. In relating itself to itself, the sentence says, the self is doing what a self does. It stands back and takes a stance toward its own life. Nothing has to be given up. The stance is not the trouble, and the cure does not ask a person to stop thinking about themselves. The cure concerns what the stance rests on.

The next clause is the hinge. In willing to be itself. The weak kind of despair could not will this, since it wanted to be rid of the self it was handed. The cure begins with consent. A person agrees to begin with the actual self, the one with this body and this history and these faults, and does not wait for a better one. That is the first condition, and it is already difficult.

If the sentence stopped there, it would describe the defiant person, who also wills to be himself. So the sentence goes on. The self rests, it says, in the power that established it. This is the clause the defiant self cannot say. It means that the willing is not a seizure. A person who consents to be themselves does so in the knowledge that they were set up. They did not make the ground they stand on. They do not have to hold the whole structure up by their own strength.

What would it take to settle into one's own life? The sentence has two replies that are really one. It takes consenting to the self one was given, and it takes ceasing to be one's own foundation. Both conditions are needed together. A person who consents without the source is a hostage to circumstance, and a person who rests in the source without consenting is only pretending to trust.

The word transparently is the least expected, and in some ways the most telling. A self that rests transparently has nothing hidden in it. The author has described many opacities along the way, the secret locked in a sealed reserve, the story that is edited to keep the unpleasant chapters out, the cheerful face that covers a dread. All of those are opaque, and often opaque even to the person who keeps them. To rest transparently is to be see-through, to the source and, in the end, to oneself. Nothing has to be guarded, because nothing is being defended.

The verb is rest, and the author means it quite exactly. Consider a person who is learning to float. The water will hold them up, but only if they stop thrashing. The more they strain to stay on top, the faster they sink, and the lesson of floating is that effort works against it. The author is making a similar point about the self. Much of what a person does to hold themselves up is the thrashing. There is the posing and the proving, and the striving to be somebody. The sickness is what the thrashing does, and the cure is to stop and be held.

A person in that condition is easy to recognize from small signs. They can say that they were wrong without making a speech about it. They can take a compliment without arguing and accept help without keeping a ledger. They can be told something unflattering and remain in the room. None of this is a technique. It follows from having nothing to defend, since the self is not being held up by a flattering picture of itself. Such a person is hard to flatter, and hard to hurt.

A self at rest in this way can also forgive itself, which was impossible before. Forgiveness had been the thing it could not give, since the debtor cannot cancel the debt. It no longer has to give it. It receives it, and what it receives is enough to let it look at its own past without turning away.

It does not follow that the cure is passivity. Someone who rests in the source still acts, loves, works, takes risks and keeps promises. In fact the book suggests that only such a person can act freely, since they are no longer using every deed to prop up an anxious self. They have been relieved of the one job that no one can do, which is holding up their own existence. The activity that remains is lighter, and truer.

The author is clear about why the power has to be what he says it is. It cannot be any lesser support, because any lesser support can be taken away. The girl's lover died or left. The ambitious man's throne never arrived. A reputation can collapse, a fortune can be lost, and a body can fail. A self that rests on any of these has simply found a new scaffolding. The ground, if it is to be a ground, must be what cannot be removed, and for the author there is only one candidate. He calls it God, and he does not accept a substitute.

A listener who cannot say that word will have to decide for themselves what to do with this. The author would not make the choice easy, and the book does not ask anyone to pretend to a faith they lack. It can still be said that the structure of the sentence is visible without the name, and that its two conditions are legible in any life, the consent to be what one is and the ceasing to prop oneself up. Whether those two conditions can be met without what the author calls God is the question the book leaves open, and he would say that it can only be answered by trying.

The subtitle promised awakening, and the book's method has been part of the cure all along. A physician who wants to cure a patient who is unaware of the illness must first make it felt. Each stretch of description has been a way of waking someone. A reader who has recognized themselves in the cellar, or in the king without a country, has already taken the first step, since no one can rest in a source they have not first noticed they were running from. The author does not expect the recognition to be pleasant. He expects it to be useful.

He also says, in the middle of the book and again as he goes on, that the possibility of the cure is itself given. Here the sentence that for God everything is possible returns. The self cannot rest by an act of will, because any such act would be one more effort of holding on. But what cannot be done by effort can still be received.

The book never says that this state is easy, or permanent, or common. Despair, as he described it, is something kept up moment by moment, and faith is the same. It is renewed or it lapses. The sentence he offers describes a person who has been healed of the sickness. He suggests that such persons are rare. The rest of us are patients who sometimes glimpse the shape of the cure.

At twenty-two, in a fishing village on the north coast of Zealand, the young Soren Kierkegaard wrote in his journal. He wrote that what he lacked was clarity about what he was to do, and not about what he was to know. What he needed, he wrote, was to find a truth that was true for him, an idea for which he could live and die.

Which is harder to see in oneself, a despair that hides or a despair that wears the look of strength?

Sources & works cited

7 in all

  1. 1.Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press
  2. 2.Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Alastair Hannay, Penguin Classics
  3. 3.Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse, W. W. Norton
  4. 4.Soren Kierkegaard. The Concept of Anxiety, translated by Reidar Thomte, Princeton University Press
  5. 5.Joakim Garff. Soren Kierkegaard: A Biography, Princeton University Press
  6. 6.Alastair Hannay. Kierkegaard: A Biography, Cambridge University Press
  7. 7.Clare Carlisle. Philosopher of the Heart: The Restless Life of Soren Kierkegaard, Allen Lane

Life Is Not A Problem To Be Solved | Kierkegaard's Philosophy To Sleep To

On Kierkegaard

22 chapters · 11 sources

This episode is a long, gentle walk through the thought of Soren Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher who believed existence is not a puzzle to be solved but something lived inwardly, one anxious choice at a time. Writing under a constellation of pseudonyms, each embodying a different mode of life, Kierkegaard staged philosophical dramas rather than building systems.

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